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Abstract. Federated learning (FL) is a popular technique to train ma-
chine learning (ML) models on decentralized data sources. In order to
sustain long-term participation of data owners, it is important to fairly
appraise each data source and compensate data owners for their contri-
bution to the training process. The Shapley value (SV) defines a unique
payoff scheme that satisfies many desiderata for a data value notion. It has
been increasingly used for valuing training data in centralized learning.
However, computing the SV requires exhaustively evaluating the model
performance on every subset of data sources, which incurs prohibitive
communication cost in the federated setting. Besides, the canonical SV
ignores the order of data sources during training, which conflicts with
the sequential nature of FL. This paper proposes a variant of the SV
amenable to FL, which we call the federated Shapley value. The federated
SV preserves the desirable properties of the canonical SV while it can be
calculated without incurring extra communication cost and is also able
to capture the effect of participation order on data value. We conduct
a thorough empirical study of the federated SV on a range of tasks,
including noisy label detection, adversarial participant detection, and
data summarization on different benchmark datasets, and demonstrate
that it can reflect the real utility of data sources for FL and has the
potential to enhance system robustness, security, and efficiency. We also
report and analyze “failure cases” and hope to stimulate future research.
Keywords: Data valuation· Federated learning· Shapley value.
1 Introduction
Building high-quality ML models often involves gathering data from different
sources. In practice, data often live in silos and agglomerating them may be
intractable due to legal constraints or privacy concerns. FL is a promising
paradigm which can obviate the need for centralized data. It directly learns
from sequestered data sources by training local models on each data source and
distilling them into a global federated model. FL has been used in applications
such as keystroke prediction [8], hotword detection [22], and medical research [3].
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2 Wang et al.
A fundamental question in FL is how to value each data source. FL makes
use of data from different entities. In order to incentivize their participation, it
is crucial to fairly appraise the data from different entities according to their
contribution to the learning process. For example, FL has been applied to financial
risk prediction for reinsurance [1], where a number of insurance companies who
may also be business competitors would train a model based on all of their data
and and the resulting model will create certain profit. In order to prompt such
collaboration, the companies need to concur with a scheme that can fairly divide
the earnings generated by the federated model among them.
The SV has been proposed to value data in recent works [6, 10, 11]. The SV
is a classic way in coopereative game theory to distribute total gains generated
by the coalition of a set of players. One can formulate ML as a cooperative game
between different data sources and then use the SV to value data. An important
reason for employing the SV is that it uniquely possesses a set of appealing
properties desired by a data value notion: it ensures that (1) all the gains of
the model are distributed among data sources; (2) the values assigned to data
owners accord with their actual contributions to the learning process; and (3)
the value of data accumulates when used multiple times.
Despite the appealing properties of the SV, it cannot be directly applied to
FL. By definition, the SV calculates the average contribution of a data source
to every possible subset of other data sources. Thus, evaluating the SV incurs
prohibitive communication cost when the data is decentralized. Moreover, the
SV neglects the order of data sources, yet in FL the importance of a data source
could depend on when it is used for training. For instance, in order to ensure
convergence, the model updates are enforced to diminish over time (e.g., by using
a decaying learning rate); therefore, intuitively, the data sources used toward the
end of learning process could be less influential than those used earlier. Hence, a
new, principled approach to valuing data for FL is needed.
In this paper, we propose the federated SV, a variant of the SV designed
to appraise decentralized, sequential data for FL. The federated SV can be
determined from local model updates in each training iteration and therefore
does not incur extra communication cost. It can also capture the effect of
participation order on data value as it examines the performance improvement
caused by each subset of players following the actual participation order in the
learning process. Particularly, the federated SV preserves the desirable properties
of the canonical SV. We present an efficient Monte Carlo method to compute the
federated SV. Furthermore, we conduct a thorough empirical study on a range
of tasks, including noisy label detection, adversarial participant detection, and
data summarization on different benchmark datasets, and demonstrate that the
federated SV can reflect the actual usefulness of data sources in FL. We also
report and analyze cases in which the proposed federated SV can be further
improved and hope to stimulate future research on this emerging topic.
A Principled Approach to Data Valuation for Federated Learning 3
2 Related Work
Various data valuation schemes have been studied in the literature, and from a
practitioners point of view they can be classified into query-based pricing that
attaches prices to user-initiated queries [18, 28]; data attribute-based pricing that
builds a price model depending on parameters such as data age and credibility
using public price registries [9]; and auction-based pricing that sets the price
dynamically based on auctions [21, 25]. However, one common drawback of the
existing strategies is that they cannot accommodate the unique properties of
data as a commodity; for instance, the value of a data source depends on the
downstream learning task and the other data sources used for solving the task.
The SV uniquely satisfies the properties desired by a data value notion. The
use of the SV for pricing personal data can be traced back to [4, 16] in the
context of marketing survey, collaborative filtering, recommendation systems,
and networks. Despite the desirable properties of the SV, computing the SV is
known to be expensive. In its most general form, the SV can be #P-complete
to compute [5]. The computational issue becomes even more serious when the
SV is used to value training data for ML, because calculating it requires re-
training models for many times. Most of the recent work on the SV-based data
valuation has been focused on the centralized learning setting and improving
its computational efficiency [6, 10, 11, 13]. Two important assumptions of the
canonical SV are that the training performance on every combination of data
points is measurable and that the performance does not depend on the order
of training data. These two assumptions are plausible for centralized learning
because the entire data is accessible to the coordinator and the data is often
shuffled before being used for training. However, they are no longer valid for the
federated setting.
Existing work on pricing data in FL can be roughly categorized into two
threads. One thread of work [14, 15] studies the mechanism design to incentivize
participation given the disparity of data quality, communication bandwidth,
and computational capability among different participants. In these works, the
authors assume that the task publisher (i.e., the coordinator) has some prior
knowledge about the data quality of a participant and design an optimal contract
to maximize the utility of the coordinator subject to rationality constraints
of individual participants. However, it remains a question how to precisely
characterize data quality in FL. Another thread of work investigates the way
to measure data quality and share the profit generated by the federated model
according to the data quality measurement. Wang et al. [29] and Song et al. [27]
apply the canonical SV to value each data source; however, as discussed earlier,
the direct application of the SV is intractable in practice due to the decentralized
data and conceptually flawed due to the sequential participation of participants.
Recently, Yu et al. [30] has studied at the intersection of two threads by proposing
a fair profit sharing scheme while considering individual costs incurred by joining
FL as well as the mismatch between contribution and payback time. Our work
can be potentially integrated with their work to better characterize the data
contribution.
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3 Data Valuation based on SV
Cooperative game theory studies the behaviors of coalitions formed by game
players. Formally, a cooperative game is defined by a pair (I, ν), where I =
{1, . . . , N} denotes the set of all players and ν : 2N → R is the utility function,
which maps each possible coalition to a real number that describes the utility of
a coalition, i.e., how much collective payoff a set of players can gain by forming
the coalition. One of the fundamental questions in cooperative game theory is
to characterize the importance of each player to the overall cooperation. The
SV [26] is a classic method to distribute the total gains generated by the coalition
of all players. The SV of player i with respect to the utility function ν is defined
as the average marginal contribution of i to coalition S over all S ⊆ I \ {i}:
sνi =
1
N
∑
S⊆I\{i}
1(
N−1
|S|
)[ν(S ∪ {i})− ν(S)] (1)
We suppress the dependency on ν when the utility used is clear and use si to
represent the value allocated to player i.
The formula in (1) can also be stated in the equivalent form:
si =
1
N !
∑
pi∈Π(I)
[
ν(Ppii ∪ {i})− ν(Ppii )
]
(2)
where pi ∈ Π(I) is a permutation of players and Ppii is the set of players which
precede player i in pi. Intuitively, imagine all players join a coalition in a random
order, and that every player i who has joined receives the marginal contribution
that his participation would bring to those already in the coalition. To calculate
si, we average these contributions over all the possible orders.
Applying these game theory concepts to data valuation, one can think of
the players as data contributors and the utility function ν(S) as a performance
measure of the model trained on the set of training data S. The SV of each
data contributor thus measures its importance to learning an ML model. The
following desirable properties that the SV uniquely possesses motivate many
prior works [4, 6, 10, 12, 13, 16] to adopt it for data valuation.
1. Group Rationality: The value of the model is completely distributed among
all data contributors, i.e., ν(I) =
∑
i∈I si.
2. Fairness: (1) Two data contributors who are identical with respect to what
they contribute to a dataset’s utility should have the same value. That is,
if data contributor i and j are equivalent in the sense that ν(S ∪ {i}) =
ν(S ∪ {j}),∀S ⊆ I \ {i, j}, then si = sj . (2) Data contributor with zero
marginal contributions to all subsets of the dataset receive zero payoff, i.e., if
ν(S ∪ {i}) = 0, ∀S ⊆ I \ {i}, then si = 0.
3. Additivity: The values under multiple utilities sum up to the value under a
utility that is the sum of all these utilities: sν1i + s
ν2
i = s
ν1+ν2
i for i ∈ I.
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The group rationality property states that any rational group of data con-
tributors would expect to distribute the full yield of their coalition. The fairness
property requires that the names of the data contributors play no role in de-
termining the value, which should be sensitive only to how the utility function
responds to the presence of a seller. The additivity property facilitates efficient
value calculation when data are used for multiple applications, each of which
is associated with a specific utility function. With additivity, one can compute
value shares separately for each application and sum them up.
There are two assumptions underlying the definition of the SV:
1. Combinatorially Evaluable Utility: The utility function can be evaluated
for every combination of players;
2. Symmetric Utility: The utility function does not depend on the order of
the players.
Both of the assumptions are plausible for centralized learning. Since the entire
data is accessible to the coordinator, it is empowered to evaluate the model
performance on the data from an arbitrary subset of contributors. Furthermore,
in centralized learning, the data is often shuffled before being used for training.
Hence, it is reasonable to consider the model performance to be independent the
order of data points in the training set. In the next section, we will argue that
these two assumption are no longer valid for FL and propose a variant of the SV
amenable to the federated setting.
4 Valuing Data for FL
4.1 Federated Shapley Value
A typical FL process executes the following steps repeatedly until some stopping
criterion is met: (1) The coordinator samples a subset of participants; (2) The
selected participants download the current global model parameters from the
coordinator; (3) Each selected participant locally computes an update to the
model by training on the local data; (4) The coordinator collects an aggregate of
the participant updates; (5) The coordinator locally updates the global model
based on the aggregated update computed from the participants that participate
in the current round.
Let I be the set of participants that participate in at least one round of
the FL process. Our goal is to assign a real value to each participant in I to
measure its contribution to learning the model. Suppose the learning process
lasts for T rounds. Let the participants selected in round t be It and we have
I = I1 ∪ · · · ∪ IT .
In FL, different participants contribute to the learning process at different
time and the performance of the federated model depends on the participation
order of participants. Clearly, the symmetric utility assumption of the SV does
not hold. Moreover, FL is designed to maintain the confidentiality of participants’
data and in each round, only a subset of participants are selected and upload their
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model updates. Hence, the coordinator can only know the model performance
change caused by adding a participant’s data into the subset of participants’
data selected earlier. However, computing the SV requires the ability to evaluate
the model performance change for every possible subset of participants. Unless
the participants are able to bear considerable extra communication cost, the
combinatorially evaluable utility assumption is invalid for FL. Hence, the SV
cannot be used to value the data of different participants in the federated setting.
We propose a variant of the SV amenable to the federated setting. The key
idea is to characterize the aggregate value of the set of participants in the same
round via the model performance change caused by the addition of their data
and then use the SV to distribute the value of the set to each participant. We
will call this variant the federated SV and its formal definition is given below.
We use ν(·) to denote the utility function which maps any participants’ data
to a performance measure of the model trained on the data. Note that unlike
in the canonical SV definition where ν(·) takes a set as an input, the argument
of ν(·) is an ordered sequence. For instance, U(A+B) means the utility of the
model that is trained on A’s data first, then B’s data. Furthermore, let I1:t−1 be
a shorthand for I1 + · · ·+ It−1 for t ≥ 2 and ∅ for t = 1.
Definition 1 (The Federated Shapley Value). Let I = {1, · · · , N} denote the
set of participants selected by the coordinator during a T -round FL process. Let
It be the set of participants selected in round t and It ⊆ I. Then, the federated
SV of participant i at round t is defined as
sνt (i) =
1
|It|
∑
S⊆It\{i}
1(|It|−1
|S|
)[ν(I1:t−1 + (S ∪ {i}))− ν(I1:t−1 + S)] if i ∈ It (3)
and st(i) = 0 otherwise. The federated SV takes the sum of the values of all
rounds:
sν(i) =
T∑
t=1
st(i) (4)
We will suppress the dependency of the federated SV sν(i) on ν whenever
the underlying utility function is self-evident.
Due to the close relation between the canonical SV and the federated SV,
one can expect that the federated variant will inherit the desirable properties of
the canonical SV. Indeed, Theorem 1 shows that the federated SV preserves the
group rationality, fairness, as well as additivity.
Theorem 1. The federated SV defined in (4) uniquely possesses the following
properties:
1. Instantaneous group rationality:
∑
i∈It st(i) = ν(I1:t)− ν(I1:t−1).
2. Fairness: (1) if ν(I1:t−1 + (S ∪ {i})) = ν(I1:t−1 + (S ∪ {j})), ∀S ⊆ It/{i, j}
for some round t, then st(i) = st(j). (2) ν(I1:t−1 + (S ∪{i})) = ν(I1:t−1 +S),
∀S ⊆ It/{i} for some round t, then st(i) = 0.
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3. Additivity: sν1+ν2(i) = sν1(i) + sν2(i) for all i ∈ I.
The proof of the theorem follows from the fact that the federated Shapley
value calculates the Shapley value for the players selected in each round which
distributes the performance difference from the previous round.
By aggregating the instantaneous group rationality equation over time, we
see that the federated SV also satisfies the long-term group rationality:
N∑
i=1
s(i) = U(I1 + · · ·+ IT ) (5)
The long-term group rationality states that the set of players participates in a
T -round FL process will divide up the final yield of their coalition.
4.2 Estimating the Federated SV
Similar to the canonical SV, computing the federated SV is expensive. Evaluating
the exact federated SV involves computing the marginal utility of every participant
to every subset of other participants selected in each round (see Eqn. 3). To
evaluate U(I1:t−1 + S), we need to update the global model trained on I1:t−1
with the aggregate of the model updates from S and calculate the updated model
performance. The total complexity is O(T2m), where m is the maximum number
of participants selected per round. In this section, we present efficient algorithms
to approximate the federated SV. We say that sˆ ∈ RN is a (, δ)-approximation
to the true SV s = [s1, · · · , sN ]T ∈ RN if Pr[||sˆi − si||∞ ≤ ] ≥ 1 − δ. These
algorithms utilize the existing approximation methods developed for the canonical
SV [12, 23] to improve the efficiency of per-round federated SV calculation.
The idea of the first approximation algorithm is to treat the Shapley value
of a participant as its expected contribution to the participants before it in
a random permutation using Eqn. 2 and use the sample average to approxi-
mate the expectation. We will call this algorithm permutation sampling-based
approximation hereinafter and the pseudocode is provided in Algorithm 2. An
application of Hoeffding bound indicates that to achieve (, δ)-approximation in
each round of updating, the number of utility evaluations required for T rounds
is Tm( 2r
2
2 ) log(
2m
δ ).
The second approximation algorithm makes use of the group testing tech-
nique [11] to estimate the per-round federated SV and we will call this algorithm
group testing-based approximation. In our scenario, each ”test” corresponds to eval-
uating the utility of a subset of participant updates. The key idea of the algorithm
is to intelligently design the sampling distribution of participants’ updates so that
we can calculate Shapely differences between the selected participants from the
test results with high-probability bound on the error. Based on the result in [11],
the number of tests required to estimate the Shapley differences up to ( C ,
δ
Cδ
) is
T1 =
4
(1−q2tot)h( 2ZrC(1−q2tot) )
log(Cδ(m−1)2δ ), where h(u) = (1 + u) log(1 + u)− u and
other variables are defined in Algorithm 3. We can then take any participant i and
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estimate the corresponding SV using the permutation sampling-based approxi-
mation, denote it as s∗. Then, the SV of all other m− 1 users can be estimated
using the estimated difference of the SV with participant i (we choose the mth
participant as the pivot participant in the pseudo-code in Algorithm 4). The
number of utility evaluation required for estimating s∗ up to (
(C−1)
C
, (Cδ−1)δCδ )
is T2 =
4r2C2
(C−1)22 log(
2Cδ
(Cδ−1)δ ). C, Cδ are chosen so that T1 + T2 are minimized.
Algorithm 1, 2, 3, and 4 present the pseudo-code for both permutation sampling
and group testing.
If we treat , δ as constant, T1+T2 ∼ O((logm)2) while permutation sampling-
based approximation is O(m logm). Therefore, when the number of selected
participants in each round is large, group testing-based approximation is sig-
nificantly faster than permutation sampling-based one. One the other hand,
when the number of selected participants is small, permutation sampling-based
approximation is more preferable since its utility evaluation complexity tends to
have a smaller constant.
Algorithm 1: Federated SV Estimation.
input :N - available participants, C - fraction of selected participants in each
round, ParticipantUpdate - function for participant’s local update, e.g.
SGD
output : (sˆ1, sˆ2, . . . , sˆN ) - estimated SV for all participants
1 Initialize global model w0; initialize Sˆi ← 0 for i = 1 . . . N .
2 for each round t = 0, 1, . . . , do
3 m← max(C ·N)
4 Ct ← random set of m participants
5 for each participant k ∈ Ct in parallel do
6 wkt+1 ← ParticipantUpdate(k,wt)
7 end
8 Sˆ[Ct]← Sˆ[Ct] + RoundSVEstimation({wkt+1}, wt)
9 wt+1 ← 1m
∑m
k=1 w
k
t+1
10 end
11 return Sˆ
5 Empirical Study
In this section, we conduct the first empirical evaluation on a range of real-
world FL tasks with different datasets to study whether the proposed data value
notion can reflect the real utility of data. The tasks include noisy data detection,
adversarial participant removal and data summarization. We would expect that a
good data value notion will assign low value to participants with noisy, adversarial,
and low-quality data, which will in turn help us remove those participants.
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Algorithm 2: RoundSVEstimation estimates the SV st for selected partic-
ipants at round t using permutation sampling
input : {wit+1}mi=1 - selected participants’ updates in round t+ 1, wt - global
model in round t, U(·) ∈ [0, r] - utility function, , δ - approximation
parameter
output : (sˆ1, . . . , sˆm) - estimated SV for selected participants
12 T ← 2r2
2
log( 2m
δ
)
13 Uprev ← U(wt)
14 Initialize sˆi ← 0 for i = 1 . . .m.
15 for t = 1 . . . T do
16 Uniformly sample a permutation S of set {wit+1}mi=1.
17 for i = 1 . . .m do
18 sˆi ← sˆi + (U(wt + S[: i])− Uprev)
19 Uprev ← U(wt + S[: i])
20 end
21 end
22 sˆ← sˆ/T
23 return sˆ
Algorithm 3: RoundSVEstimation estimates the SV st for selected partic-
ipants at round t using group testing
input : {wit+1}mi=1 - selected participants’ updates in round t+ 1, wt - global
model in round t, U(·) ∈ [0, r] - utility function, , δ - approximation
parameter, C, Cδ - tradeoff parameters
output : (sˆ1, . . . , sˆm) - estimated SV for selected participants
24 Utot ← U(wt + {wit+1}mi=1)
25 Z ← 2∑m−1k=1 1k
26 q(k)← 1
k
( 1
k
+ 1
m−k ) for k = 1 . . .m− 1.
27 qtot ← m−2m q(1) +
∑m−1
k=2 q(k)[1 +
2k(k−m)
m(m−1) ]
28 T ← 4
(1−q2tot)h( 2ZrC(1−q2tot)
)
log(Cδ(m−1)
2δ
)
29 Initialize (a)ti ← 0, t = 1 . . . T , i = 1 . . .m.
30 for t = 1 . . . T do
31 Draw kt ∼ q(k)
32 Uniformly sample a length-kt sequence S from {1, . . . ,m}.
33 ati ← 1 for all i ∈ S
34 Bt ← U(wt + S)
35 end
36 Cij ← ZT
∑T
t=1Bt(Ati −Atj) for i = 1 . . .m, j = 1 . . .m.
37 sˆ← DiffToSV(Cij)
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Algorithm 4: DiffToSV recovers the SV st for selected participants at
round t from the estimated difference Cij .
38 T ← 4r2C2
(C−1)22 log(
2Cδ
(Cδ−1)δ )
39 sˆ∗ ← 0
40 for t = 1 . . . T do
41 Uniformly sample a subset S from {1, . . . ,m− 1}
42 sˆ∗ ← sˆ∗ + 1T (U(wt + S ∪ {m})− U(wt + S))
43 end
44 for i=1. . .m do
45 sˆi = sˆ∗ + Cim
46 end
47 return sˆ = (sˆ1, . . . , sˆm)
5.1 Baseline Approaches
We will compare the federated SV with the following two baselines.
Federated Leave-One-Out One natural way to assign the contribution to
a participant update i at round t is by calculating the model performance change
when the participant is removed from the set of participants selected at round t,
i.e., loot(i) = U(I1:t)− U(I1:t−1 + It/{i}), and loot(i) = 0 if participant i is not
selected in round t. The Leave-One-Out (LOO) value for FL takes the sum of
the LOO values of all rounds: loo(i) =
∑T
t=1 loot(i).
Random The random baseline does not differentiate between different par-
ticipants’ contribution and just randomly selects participants to perform a given
task.
In the figures, we will use Fed. LOO and Fed. SV to denote federated leave-
one-out and federated Shapley Value approach, respectively.
5.2 Experiment Setting
For each task, we perform experiments on the MNIST [20] as well as the CIFAR10
dataset [19]. Following [24], we study two ways of partitioning the MNIST data
over participants: IID, where the data is shuffled, and then partitioned into 100
participants each receiving 600 examples, and Non-IID, where we first sort the
data by digit label, divide it into 200 shards of size 300, and assign each of 100
participants 2 shards. For MNIST, we train a simple multilayer-perceptron (MLP)
with 2-hidden layers with 200 neurons in each layer and ReLu activations as well
as a simple CNN. For all experiments on CIFAR10, we train a CNN with two 5x5
convolution layers (the first with 32 channels, the second with 64, each followed by
2x2 max pooling), a fully connected layer with 512 neurons with ReLu activation,
and a final softmax output layer. In each round of training, we randomly select 10
participants out of 100, unless otherwise specified. We run 25 rounds for training
on MNIST, achieving up to 97% and 92% global model accuracy for the IID and
the non-IID setting, respectively. For CIFAR10, we run up to 50 to 200 rounds of
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training. We achieve up 77% and 70% test accuracy in IID and non-IID setting,
respectively, for 200 rounds of training. As a side note, the state-of-the-art models
in [17] can achieve test accuracy of 99.4% for CIFAR10; nevertheless, our goal
is to evaluate the proposed data value notion rather than achieving the best
possible accuracy. We use the permutation sampling approach in Algorithm 2 to
estimate the Shapley value in all experiments since the number of participants is
small.
5.3 Noisy Label Detection
Labels in the real world are often noisy due to annotators varying skill-levels,
biases or malicious tampering. We show that the proposed data value notion can
help removing the noisy participants. The key idea is to rank the participants
according to their data value, and drop the participants with the lowest values.
We set 20 participants’ local data to be noisy where noise flipping ratio is
10% for MNIST, and 3% for CIFAR10. The performances of different data value
measures are illustrated in Figure 1a and 1b. We inspect the label of participant’s
local training instances that have the lowest scores, and plot the change of
the fraction of detected noisy participants with the fraction of the inspected
participants. We can see that when the training data is partitioned in IID setting,
federated LOO and federated SV perform similarly. However, in the Non-IID
setting, the federated SV outperforms federated LOO. We conjecture that this
is because for Non-IID participants, the trained local models tend to overfit,
diverge from the global model, and exhibit low accuracy. In comparison with
the federated SV, federated LOO only computes the marginal contribution of a
participant to the largest subset of other selected participants and therefore the
noisy participants are harder to be identified by federated LOO.
We also find that, with the number of training rounds increases, the total
contribution of participants in each round will decrease, as shown in Figure 2a.
This makes sense since the federated SV satisfies instantaneous group rationality
in Theorem 1, and the improvement of global model’s utility will slowdown when
it is close to convergence. That is, it is relatively easy to improve the global
model’s utility in earlier rounds, while harder to further improve the utility in
later rounds. Hence, the contribution of participants selected in early rounds is
inflated. This inspires us to consider a variant of data value measures, which
normalize the per-round data values by their norms and then aggregate them
across all rounds. The performance of noisy label detection with the normalized
versions of federated SV and federated LOO is shown in Figure 1c and 1d. As we
can see, it is much easier to separate noisy participants from benign participants
with the normalized version of data value notions. However, the normalized
federated SV no longer preserves the group rationality and additivity property.
We leave developing more detailed analysis of different variants of data value as
future work.
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(a) MNIST (b) CIFAR10
(c) MNIST - norm. (d) CIFAR10 - norm.
Fig. 1: Experiment results of (a) (b) noisy label detection; (c) (d) noisy label
detection with normalized federated LOO/SV.
5.4 Backdoor Attack Detection
Motivated by privacy concerns, in FL, the coordinator is designed to have no
visibility into a participants local data and training process. This lack of trans-
parency in the agent updates can be exploited so that an adversary controlling
a small number of malicious participants can perform a backdoor attack. The
adversary’s objective is to cause the jointly trained global model to misclassify a
set of chosen inputs, i.e. it seeks to poison the global model in a targeted manner,
while also ensures that the global model has a good performance on the clean test
data. We focus on backdoor attacks based on the model replacement paradigm
proposed by [2].
For CIFAR10, following the settings in [2], we choose the feature of vertically
stripped walls in the background (12 images) as the backdoor. For MNIST,
we implement pixel-pattern backdoor attack in [7]. We set the ratio of the
participants controlled by the adversary to be 30%. We mix backdoor images
with benign images in every training batch (20 backdoor images per batch of size
64) for compromised participants, following the settings in [2].
In Figure 3a and 3b, we show the success rate of backdoor detection with
respect to the fraction of checked participants. Both of the figures indicate that
federated SV is a more effective than federated LOO for detecting compromised
participants. In the Non-IID setting, both compromised participants and some
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benign participants tend to have low contribution on the main task performance,
which makes the compromised participants more difficult to be identified by the
low data values. Hence, we also test the performance of normalized version of
federated SV/LOO for this task and Figure 3c and 3d show that the performance
improves a lot compared with the original definitions.
(a) Norm (b) MNIST (c) CIFAR10
Fig. 2: (a) Norm of Contribution varies with different rounds for MNIST-IID; (b)
(c) Illustrations of Backdoor Image
5.5 Data Summarization
In our data summarization experiments, we investigate whether the federated SV
can facilitate federated training by identifying the most valuable participants. Per
communication round, a percentage of the selected participants is ignored for the
update of the global model. We use data value measures to dismiss participants
that are expected to contribute the least to the model accuracy. The data values
are calculated on a separate validation set, which contains 1000 and 800 random
samples for MNIST and CIFAR10, respectively. During each communication
round of FL, we compute the data value summands. After training has finished,
we compute the total data value.
We then repeat training, while maintaining an identical selection of par-
ticipants per round. During each round, we dismiss a certain fraction q ∈
[0, 0.1, . . . , 0.9] of the selected participants. We compute and average the re-
sults for the random baseline three times per run.
We train a small CNN model on the MNIST dataset. The CNN consists
of two 5x5 convolution layers, each followed with 2x2 max pooling and ReLu
activations. Two fully connected layers (input, hidden and output dimensions of
320, 50, 10, respectively) with intermediate ReLu activation follow the second
convolution layer. We apply dropout on the second convolution and first fully
connected layer. For CIFAR10, we operate on 1000-dimensional feature vectors
extracted with an imagenet-pretrained MobileNet v2 mode.6 We train a MLP
with 2-hidden layers with 1000 neurons in each layer and ReLu activations.
6 We use preprocessing and the pretrained model as provided by PyTorch Hub
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We evaluate our algorithm for FL of 10 rounds on MNIST and 100 rounds on
CIFAR10. The results of our experiments are shown in Figure 4. For the MNIST
IID case, the federated SV approach outperforms both baselines. While it also
consistently outperforms the random baseline in the non-IID setting, federated
LOO achieves higher test accuracies for lower fractions of dismissed samples.
Here, analysis of the federated SV per participant shows that it tends to be higher
for participants that are selected throughout the FL. Furthermore, we observe
that participants that were sampled few times also are more likely to have a
negative federated SV, compared to the IID setting. We hypothesize that this
bias negatively affects the performance of the federated SV-based summarization
in the non-IID setting.
We also observe that both federated SV and LOO perform worse on the CI-
FAR10 dataset summarization. We hypothesize that selection of good participant
subsets is more effective on the MNIST dataset, as it contains a larger portion of
redundant samples. Consequently, valuable information is less likely to be lost by
dismissal of a fraction of participants.
6 Conclusion
This paper proposes the federated SV, a principled notion to value data for the
process of FL. The federated SV uniquely possesses the properties desired by
a data value notion, including group rationality, fairness, and additivity, while
enjoying communication-efficient calculation and being able to capture the effect
of participant participation order on the data value. We present algorithms to
approximate the federated SV and these algorithms are significantly more efficient
than the exact algorithm when the number of participants is large. Finally, we
demonstrate that the federated SV can reflect the actual utility of data sources
through a range of tasks, including noisy label detection, adversarial participant
detection, and data summarization.
A Principled Approach to Data Valuation for Federated Learning 15
(a) MNIST (b) CIFAR10
(c) MNIST - norm. (d) CIFAR10 - norm.
Fig. 3: Experiment results of (a) (b) backdoor detection; (c) (d) backdoor detection
with normalized LOO/SV.
(a) MNIST, IID, T = 10 (b) MNIST, non-IID, T = 10
(c) CIFAR, IID, T = 100 (d) CIFAR, non-IID, T = 100
Fig. 4: Data summarization experiments on MNIST (top) and Cifar10 (bottom).
Bibliography
[1] Webank and swiss re signed cooperation mou, 2019.
URL https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/
webank-and-swiss-re-signed-cooperation-mou-1028228738#.
[2] E. Bagdasaryan, A. Veit, Y. Hua, D. Estrin, and V. Shmatikov. How
to backdoor federated learning. In International Conference on Artificial
Intelligence and Statistics, pages 2938–2948, 2020.
[3] W. D. Brouwer. The federated future is ready for
shipping, 2019. URL https://medium.com/@_doc_ai/
the-federated-future-is-ready-for-shipping-d17ff40f43e3.
[4] M. Chessa and P. Loiseau. A cooperative game-theoretic approach to quantify
the value of personal data in networks. In Proceedings of the 12th workshop
on the Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation, page 9. ACM,
2017.
[5] X. Deng and C. H. Papadimitriou. On the complexity of cooperative solution
concepts. Mathematics of Operations Research, 19(2):257–266, 1994.
[6] A. Ghorbani and J. Zou. Data shapley: Equitable valuation of data for
machine learning. arXiv preprint arXiv:1904.02868, 2019.
[7] T. Gu, K. Liu, B. Dolan-Gavitt, and S. Garg. Badnets: Evaluating back-
dooring attacks on deep neural networks. IEEE Access, 7:47230–47244,
2019.
[8] A. Hard, K. Rao, R. Mathews, S. Ramaswamy, F. Beaufays, S. Augenstein,
H. Eichner, C. Kiddon, and D. Ramage. Federated learning for mobile
keyboard prediction. arXiv preprint arXiv:1811.03604, 2018.
[9] J. R. Heckman, E. L. Boehmer, E. H. Peters, M. Davaloo, and N. G. Kurup.
A pricing model for data markets. iConference 2015 Proceedings, 2015.
[10] R. Jia, D. Dao, B. Wang, F. A. Hubis, N. M. Gurel, B. Li, C. Zhang,
C. Spanos, and D. Song. Efficient task-specific data valuation for nearest
neighbor algorithms. Proceedings of the VLDB Endowment, 12(11):1610–
1623, 2019.
[11] R. Jia, D. Dao, B. Wang, F. A. Hubis, N. Hynes, N. M. Gurel, B. Li,
C. Zhang, D. Song, and C. Spanos. Towards efficient data valuation based
on the shapley value. arXiv preprint arXiv:1902.10275, 2019.
[12] R. Jia, D. Dao, B. Wang, F. A. Hubis, N. Hynes, B. Li, C. Zhang, D. Song,
and C. Spanos. Towards efficient data valuation based on the shapley value.
AISTATS, 2019.
[13] R. Jia, X. Sun∗, J. Xu∗, C. Zhang, B. Li, and D. Song. An empirical and
comparative analysis of data valuation with scalable algorithms. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1911.07128, 2019.
[14] J. Kang, Z. Xiong, D. Niyato, S. Xie, and J. Zhang. Incentive mechanism
for reliable federated learning: A joint optimization approach to combining
reputation and contract theory. IEEE Internet of Things Journal, 6(6):
10700–10714, 2019.
A Principled Approach to Data Valuation for Federated Learning 17
[15] J. Kang, Z. Xiong, D. Niyato, H. Yu, Y.-C. Liang, and D. I. Kim. Incentive
design for efficient federated learning in mobile networks: A contract the-
ory approach. In 2019 IEEE VTS Asia Pacific Wireless Communications
Symposium (APWCS), pages 1–5. IEEE, 2019.
[16] J. Kleinberg, C. H. Papadimitriou, and P. Raghavan. On the value of private
information. In Proceedings of the 8th conference on Theoretical aspects of
rationality and knowledge, pages 249–257. Morgan Kaufmann Publishers
Inc., 2001.
[17] A. Kolesnikov, L. Beyer, X. Zhai, J. Puigcerver, J. Yung, S. Gelly, and
N. Houlsby. Big transfer (bit): General visual representation learning. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1912.11370, 2019.
[18] P. Koutris, P. Upadhyaya, M. Balazinska, B. Howe, and D. Suciu. Query-
based data pricing. Journal of the ACM (JACM), 62(5):43, 2015.
[19] A. Krizhevsky, G. Hinton, et al. Learning multiple layers of features from
tiny images. 2009.
[20] Y. LeCun and C. Cortes. MNIST handwritten digit database. 2010. URL
http://yann.lecun.com/exdb/mnist/.
[21] J.-S. Lee and B. Hoh. Sell your experiences: a market mechanism based
incentive for participatory sensing. In Pervasive Computing and Commu-
nications (PerCom), 2010 IEEE International Conference on, pages 60–68.
IEEE, 2010.
[22] D. Leroy, A. Coucke, T. Lavril, T. Gisselbrecht, and J. Dureau. Federated
learning for keyword spotting. In ICASSP 2019-2019 IEEE International
Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing (ICASSP), pages
6341–6345. IEEE, 2019.
[23] S. Maleki. Addressing the computational issues of the Shapley value with
applications in the smart grid. PhD thesis, University of Southampton, 2015.
[24] B. McMahan, E. Moore, D. Ramage, S. Hampson, and B. A. y Arcas.
Communication-efficient learning of deep networks from decentralized data.
In Artificial Intelligence and Statistics, pages 1273–1282, 2017.
[25] M. Mihailescu and Y. M. Teo. Dynamic resource pricing on federated clouds.
In Cluster, Cloud and Grid Computing (CCGrid), 2010 10th IEEE/ACM
International Conference on, pages 513–517. IEEE, 2010.
[26] L. S. Shapley. A value for n-person games. Contributions to the Theory of
Games, 2(28):307–317, 1953.
[27] T. Song, Y. Tong, and S. Wei. Profit allocation for federated learning.
In 2019 IEEE International Conference on Big Data (Big Data), pages
2577–2586. IEEE, 2019.
[28] P. Upadhyaya, M. Balazinska, and D. Suciu. Price-optimal querying with
data apis. PVLDB, 9(14):1695–1706, 2016.
[29] G. Wang, C. X. Dang, and Z. Zhou. Measure contribution of participants
in federated learning. In 2019 IEEE International Conference on Big Data
(Big Data), pages 2597–2604. IEEE, 2019.
[30] H. Yu, Z. Liu, Y. Liu, T. Chen, M. Cong, X. Weng, D. Niyato, and Q. Yang.
A fairness-aware incentive scheme for federated learning. In Proceedings
of the AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society, pages 393–399,
2020.
